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Option value and volatility value of a credit

Wednesday, March 10th, 2010

Alternatively, the investor could wait another year (i.e. to maturity of the option), and observe where the stock price has gone. If the stock price has gone down to, say, US$ 80, he or she would be happy to have waited since a loss would have been avoided. If, on the other hand, the stock rose further to, say, US$ 130, the investor could still exercise the option and put down the strike price of US$ 100. If he or she had exercised earlier, a stock worth US$ 130 would be held. However, the later the strike price needs to paid, the more interest can be earned on that money. Therefore, also in this scenario, it was wiser to wait as long as possible, i.e. until maturity. It follows that a longer maturity is more valuable, i.e. results in a higher option price, even if the option cannot be exercised before maturity.

As just seen, the remaining time to maturity is valuable. Consequently, the option price must be worth more than the intrinsic value (i.e. the US$ 10 that are collected in the above example if exercised immediately). That additional value is related to time to maturity and volatility. Higher volatility makes it more valuable to wait and see, i.e. to have the chance of avoiding a large loss by not exercising early. This difference between the option value and its intrinsic value is thus often called the time or volatility value.

Succeeding with credit decisions

Thursday, October 15th, 2009

Mergers and acquisitions are increasingly important for many firms; this applies especially to medium and large undertakings and those operating in more than one market. In particular, liberalisation of trade and globalisation of business and financial markets have boosted activity in them. In 2001, merger activity reached a peak and then dropped dramatically as firms reacted to economic uncertainties and wild stockmarket fluctuations. Such cautious conservatism won’t last: an is such a potentially powerful route to growth and competitive advantage that as soon as economic confidence returns, so will mania. Even before then, plucky entrepreneurs and bold shareholders may see opportunities to pick up a bargain, such as a sound business that may have encountered short-term difficulties. However, problems are common following business mergers, with 48% of merged companies underperforming in their industry after three years, according to a 1997 report by Mercer Management Consulting. An enquiry conducted and published in the Harvard Business Review (November 1997) highlighted this point:

Fewer than 50% of mergers ever reach anywhere near the economic or strategic destination that was envisioned for
them. In fact, in many cases the mergers fail because the new company’s managers underestimated, ignored, or mishandled the integration tasks.

Anecdotal evidence from business analysts and commentators suggests that although this information is now some years old, it still holds true. Mergers are no more a guarantee of growth and prosperity today than they ever were.